Notes. National-level data from 2013 NCES Digest of Education Statistics. Data on students compiled from California Community College Chancellor's Office Datamart and cover 2013 academic year. Data on awards compiled from administrative sources. Data count each award separately, not taking into account multiple awards per student.
A Appendices

A.1 Additional Tables and Figures
and fixed effects use estimates from Appendix Table A4 . Earnings benefits are the log estimate converted to a percent, multiplied by the counterfactual earnings mean. Counterfactual earnings in the first quarter are $4,740, and the columns of the table show whether there is zero, 3%, or 10% subsequent annual earnings growth. Earnings effects are calculated up to 21 quarters and are assumed to be zero afterwards. The first three columns of the table show estimates where students are assumed to pay $350 in tuition each quarter for the first six quarters, while the second set of three columns assume the students have their tuition waived. All students are assumed to pay $5,700 upfront in costs and supplies.
A.2 Matching Between Lottery and Academic Data
A.2.1 Description of Match
Information on the result of each application to the Central College ADN lottery comes from a spreadsheet that includes student names, date of birth, gender, an identification number, the semester of the application, and the application result. There are 4,726 applications in the full Central College lottery file. All other information, such as course-taking, demographics, financial aid, and earnings, comes from the California Community College data system. There is no one-forone crosswalk between the two datasets: the student identification number in the lottery data is used for internal Central College purposes and does not match the student identification numbers in the academic data. This appendix describes the process I implement to match between the Central College lottery data and the system-wide academic data.
In the first step of the process, I matched based on the sets of identifying information that were common to the two datasets. The lottery data has first and last name, date of birth, and gender. The academic data has date of birth and gender, but only the first three letters of each student's first and last names. Therefore, I used date of birth, gender, and the first three letters of first and last names to match. Two records in the application file were exact duplicates on these four identifying characteristics, so I drop both of them from the match. Likewise, four percent of all 26,559,940 students in the full academic file were not unique on these four variables, so I also drop these students as potential matches to the applications. I was able to match 3,473 (73 percent) of the 4,724 non-duplicate Central College lottery applicants to a unique student record in the statewide academic file.
To improve the match rate, I then did a second round of matching for the 1,251 still unmatched Central College applicants. This time, I limited the sample to 386,513 students in the larger academic file who had ever enrolled in a course at Central College and were not already matched to an applicant record. Of these students, 372,728 (96 percent) had unique values on the identifying information. This match yielded an additional 431 applicants matched to academic records. This means that, overall, I was able to match 3,904 of 4,724 applicants to academic records, for an overall match rate of 83 percent.
A.2.2 Match Diagnostics
The main concern with the match process is that it might be non-random. In other words, it may be the case that applicants I am able to match to the system-wide academic data are systematically different than students I am not able to match. This would be particularly problematic if matched students were more likely to be admitted to the program or to enroll in it. I regress a dummy for being admitted on the match outcome and find a coefficient of 0.004 (s.e.=0.018, p=0.82). A similar regression where I regress admission status on a stricter version of the match outcome (i.e. matched in the initial process, without accounting for college) yields a coefficient of -0.011 (s.e.=0.016, p=0.461). This suggests that the match does not seem to be causing differential selection on the lottery outcome.
Another potential concern is if a substantial number of applicants did not take their prerequisites at a community college in California. If this were the case, then admitted students would be more likely to be matched: some non-admitted students would never appear in the system-wide academic data, having never taken a California community college course. Students could potentially take their courses in for-profit in-state institutions, four-year colleges, out-of-state colleges, or in high school. In conversations with administrators, including the dean of Central College's health sciences department, I learned that out-of-state applications are rare and prerequisites from for-profits are also rarely accepted. Moreover, high school classes with college credit such as AP's are not accepted as fulling prerequisites. Empirically, I cannot observe whether unmatched applicants took their prerequisites out of state. However, I do find that 90 percent of students had taken community college coursework prior to applying, with no substantial differences between students who enrolled and those who did not.
As a final check, Appendix Table A10 shows the main results, limiting the sample to only applicants who were matched in the first type of matching. That is, it does not include students who were matched based on college. These results are quite similar to the main results from Table 3 . 
A.3 Additional Robustness Exercises
A.3.1 Multiple Lotteries
The first two columns of Appendix Table A11 shows estimates where I utilize variation from the up to four random lotteries a student can enter. Each lottery a student applies to is a valid instrument for immediate enrollment. For example, among all students in their second lottery attempt, admission is random and also a valid instrument for enrollment. I estimate the following first-stage equation:
where Admit ig is a dummy variable taking a value of one for a student winning their gth lottery, with g ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4. Each student is represented up to four times in this setup. When g = 1 equation 1 is equivalent to equation 2. In other words, the coefficient δ 1 yields the average effect of winning a lottery on subsequent enrollment. I include lottery instance fixed effects θ g and lottery term fixed effects π c in order to separately identify the effect of each individual lottery pool. I cluster standard errors at the individual level.
A potential concern in leveraging all four potential lotteries a student enters is that there may be selection in who reapplies among the set of lottery losers. The local average treatment effect of each lottery would be different if, for example, first-time applicants were systematically different than third-time applicants. However, the cost of reapplying, which only involves clicking a button on a computer screen, is relatively low, and most students do reapply. This makes it less likely that using all four lotteries to estimate the effects will introduce bias. Appendix Table A12 shows that observable characteristics do not strongly predict reapplication among lottery losers, meaning that the pool of applicants is quite similar across lottery instances. Moreover, a test that the coefficients across the first four columns of the table are equal yields a χ 2 statistic with a p-value of 0.53.
Column 1 shows the resulting coefficient. There are more than four observations per student because each student can be represented with up to four applications, with four years of earnings data per application. The coefficient is slightly smaller than that using just the first lottery, but marginally so.
Since all applicants apply for a first time but not necessarily in subsequent lotteries, students with multiple applications are overly represented, so in column 2 I weight the regressions by w i = 1
where k takes values one through four. This weighting approach does not make a substantial difference on the estimate.
A.3.2 One-Step Dynamic Regression
The third column of Appendix Table A11 shows estimates of the "one-step" regression as used by Gelber, Isen and Kessler (2016) and Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) in scenarios where applicants may reapply. One concern is that reapplication itself may have an effect on later earnings.
In the case of the Central College lottery, losing a lottery increases the likelihood of participating in a future lottery. This is similar to the case of Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) , where a district failing to pass a bond is more likely to consider a similar bond in a later year than a district that succeeded in passing a bond. The "one-step" estimator Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) propose takes this added effect into account. I adapt this estimator using the following equation of the reduced form:
The coefficient of interest, θ τ , represents the effect of winning the lottery on earnings at year τ regardless of the effect of losing the lottery on future lottery participation and admission to the program. The coefficient is similar in magnitude to the preferred estimate, but less precisely estimated.
A.3.3 Any Enrollment
The main lottery estimates instrument for immediate enrollment following application. Instrumenting for ever enrolling in the program is less clean than the preferred specification because some students who ultimately enroll are admitted through the non-random fifth application. This approach will lead to an additional group of non-compliers, those who were not admitted in their first lottery attempt, but were admitted in a future lottery. I estimate the effect of ever enrolling in The fourth column of Appendix Table A11 shows this estimate, which is larger than my preferred estimate.
A.3.4 Individual Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables
The final specification combines the individual fixed effects approach described in section 6 with the instrumental variables from the lottery. I estimate equation 3, but treat the timing of enrollment as the endogenous regressor to be instrumented with the lottery result. In this case, I run the following first stage for equation 3:
where P ost Admit it is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one in quarters after a student has been admitted to the Central College ADN program through a random lottery. Thus, the enrollment effects are identied by the interaction between the lottery and time relative to enrollment. These are comparable to the estimates of the effect of ever enrolling in the program, as there is no way to separate out immediate enrollment, which is the preferred estimate. The coefficient is in the final column of Appendix Table A11 and is similar to the coefficient in the previous column. Column 1 shows estimates of the effect of immediate enrollment in the Central College ADN program, instrumented with result of each of up to four applications a student submitted. There are four quarters of data for each application, corresponding to quarters 18 through 21 after the application date. Column 2 weights each observation by the inverse of the number of applications the student submitted. Column 3 shows estimates from equation 5. Column 4 limits the sample to the first application, but endogenous regressor is ever enrolling in the Central College ADN program, as opposed to immediate enrollment. Regressions in Columns 1 through 4 control for calendar time, application cohort, demographics (age, gender, race), academic background (prior GPA, prior number of units), prior financial aid receipt (Pell grants, tuition waivers), and prior labor market experience (mean prior earnings, any prior employment in health). Standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
